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that 'suppositions' in his sense differ from the objects of true judgment, whilst Meinong holds that the objects of *Annahmen* ('Objectives,' as he calls them) are the same as the objects of judgments. But it is possible that I may have misunderstood Mr. Carr here, for he is rather condensed, and it is doubtful whether his popular readers will make much of this eighth chap-

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ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL:

A Contribution to the Phenomenology of the Thought Processes.

Thesis approved for the degree of doctor of science in the University of London. By Francis Aveling, Ph.D., D.Sc., D.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. x, 225.

Dr. Aveling's purpose is to discover what is in consciousness "when we think the universal or the individual." He accordingly devised experiments to produce the mental phenomena concerned. He arranged ten sets each of five pictures, which were displayed to his subjects one at a time, along with one of ten nonsense words, corresponding to the ten sets. For example, 'Ferod' was the word for pictures of boys running, leaping, etc. After each session in the learning-period, the words were exposed as stimuli, the subject reacting when "the meaning of the word appeared in consciousness in any form": introspections were then taken. After the learning-period, the words were given as the subjects of incomplete sentences, *e. g.*, "All Ferods are —," "The largest Sorab is —," etc. These were calculated to make the words "function as universals or individuals." The subjects had to complete the sentences, and introspections were taken. His main conclusions are as follows:

The words acquired meaning by an association process, where either a concept was abstracted from the objects or they were subsumed under a concept previously so obtained. This concept, which need not be accompanied by sensorial elements, when revived by the word gave it its meaning. Thinking always involves such concepts. When images occur, they give the concept stability. Images seem to be necessary in thinking an individual.

It is needless to show the connection of this with the work of such psychologists as Bühler, and all interested in this recent development of experimental psychology will appreciate

Dr. Aveling's book, especially as he gives a fairly full selection of the introspective evidence.

But Dr. Aveling is not always satisfactory in his use even of familiar terms, or in his psychological analysis. For example, in using the tripartite division of the modes of being conscious of an object (p. 124), he implies that concepts are to be so classified under one of these heads. Yet he makes them the objects of each of these modes of being conscious. Again, they are "referable to the process of cognition" (p. 137). They convey meaning, but he often identifies meaning and concept, and each of them with "objects," "relations," and "values." He does not explain whether, when I am thinking of *x*, my concept is my thinking of *x*, or whether I am thinking only of a concept, or of a concept and also of something which is really *x*. Somehow or other, he implies, I can cognize what is not a concept, *viz.*, that to which a concept refers: this he usually makes a "meaning" [one of his vaguest terms], and this in turn becomes a concept!

He does not seem to have any right to say that "conceptual contents" are the "only necessary elements of thought, by association of which thought processes can alone be explained" (p. 148). Images were frequently reported as giving the meaning (p. 187), and are held by him to be necessary in thinking of an individual (pp. 185 *ff.*, and appendix). Nor does he sufficiently explain the relation of the conceptual elements to the sensorial elements in the original perception from which they are abstracted. He holds that to have a sensation is to cognize it and that a concept is necessary for this even in the most elementary consciousness: this would be quite intelligible only if we knew exactly what he means by concept and its relation to cognition, but it does not at all seem obvious, and an important school of experimental psychologists would absolutely deny it.

I have selected only one illustration of defective and ambiguous analysis. He also uses such phrases as tendency, potentially, condensed, conflues, without explaining precisely what he means by them. There is a note on p. 250 where he says that the concept as a mental process is actual, but that as concept, whether pure or accompanied by imagery, it is non-actual, from the point of view of the phenomenology of mental process. Whatever this means, he has not used the distinction which seems

to underlie it, in the main part of his essay, and the meaning of "concept" becomes still more vague.

One or two of the many points about such experiments may be remarked. The judgments about the subjects of the incomplete sentences may very easily have been mere memory judgments, in a number of cases, where all the thinking had been done before: and this real process may have occurred previously to the learning-period, and at that time been reproduced pretty much in the same way. At any rate, the necessity of completing a sentence is a very inadequate reproduction of the way we think. Dr. Aveling gives a historical introduction, the latter part of which will acquaint his readers with some of the recent work in this department of psychology.

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CHARACTER AND LIFE. Edited by Percy L. Parker. London: Williams & Norgate, 1912. Pp. x, 240.

This book is a symposium, in which five well-known authorities discuss the subject of character in relation respectively to Evolution, Society, Art, Bohemianism, and History. Dr. Russel Wallace, the most distinguished of the five contributors, writes of "Evolution and Character" with freshness and originality. He is, of course, a strong upholder of the theory of natural selection as the predominant method of organic evolution, but he does not believe that it will account for the higher mental or spiritual nature of man. This nature, he holds, is not the mere animal nature advanced through survival of the fittest, but is probably due to some spiritual influx. Further, he gives strong reasons for thinking that there is no good evidence of any considerable improvement in man's average intellectual and moral status during the whole period of human history. If we accept the view that acquired characters cannot be transmitted by inheritance, it is certainly difficult to see how such improvement could have come about, for there has been no other selective agency at work. As Dr. Wallace says, "There has certainly been no special survival of the more intellectual and moral, but rather the reverse." Advance in knowledge and material civilization does not necessarily imply advance in intellectual or moral capacity. Dr. Wallace believes, however, that there will be an advance in character in the not distant future,